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Abstract: The persuasive power of narratives, which has been demonstrated in a
host of psychological experiments, offers a rewarding field of research for
literary studies in general and ethical criticism in particular. If fictional as well
as factual narratives can change the beliefs of readers, then they are ethically
meaningful to disseminate values, emotional dispositions, and cognitive prac-
tices. Building on recent research in psychology and literary studies, this article
explores in three steps the ethical value of fictional narratives. First, the persua-
sive power of narratives is discussed from a cognitive perspective, which in-
cludes consideration of the ethical consequences of taking the perspectives of
others. Second, these insights are connected to a delineation of narrative con-
ventions, which can foster the kind of deeper understanding associated with
altruistic behavior. In the third part, pertinent narrative strategies are discussed
from an ethical perspective. A brief conclusion summarizes the most important
results and sketches some fields that merit exploration in future studies of
ethical criticism.
Keywords: cognitive narratology, narrative conventions, persuasion, ethics, per-
spective taking
Narratives are persuasive: they can induce listeners to change their values and
opinions. But even though the persuasive power of narrative is taken for granted
and exploited in fields such as marketing and politics, literary scholars have as
yet been reluctant to acknowledge this potential of narrative. Psychologists have
tried to understand which kinds of narrative are more persuasive than others, but
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literary scholars have not invested a lot of energy on that score.1 This is arguably a
less than satisfying state of affairs, not least as the power of narratives to
influence readers offers a rewarding area of research for literary studies in general
and ethical criticism in particular. If narratives can alter the beliefs of readers,
then they are important tools for spreading values, emotional dispositions, and
cognitive practices. This does not mean, however, that fictional narratives are
necessarily moral; instead, they can be used for myriad sorts of (im)moral
purposes. As Fredric Jameson asserts in his influential consideration of the
ideology of form – a consideration recently adopted by Terry Eagleton – there is a
close relation between formal features and ethics. However, despite Jameson’s
very suggestive ideas about the value of form as “immanently and intrinsically an
ideology in its own right” (141, see also 99), and Eagleton’s repeated emphasis of
the link between the morals and the literary form of a work of literature (see
Eagleton 46–51, 59), the question as to which narrative conventions shape a
story’s ethics – and that in turn might influence readers – has been largely
neglected. The works of Catherine Harrison, Wolfgang Müller, and James Phelan
are invaluable exceptions amongst a host of studies concentrating on the content
of stories. In the following, I will clarify the question concerning the ethical
importance of narrative conventions by combining recent research in psychology
with narrative theory. I argue that it is worthwhile to take the persuasive power of
fiction seriously by practicing an ethical criticism that acknowledges the impor-
tance of form, and, at the same time, developing criteria for evaluating the ethics
of fictional works.
The Persuasive Power of Fictional Narratives
A large body of psychological research has demonstrated that reading stories
changes readers’ beliefs, their attitudes, and even their personality traits (see Mar,
Oatley, and Peterson; see also Green, Brock, and Kaufmann 313; and Djikic,
Oatley, Zoeterman, and Peterson, 28). At first sight, these results seem surprising:
who would have thought that a simple story can induce American students to
believe that eating chocolate helps you lose weight or that brushing your teeth is
bad for your gums? Yet this is exactly what studies have found, and these initial
findings have subsequently been replicated and broadened in scope since the end
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1 Though scholars such as Jay Hillis Miller, Paul Hernadi or Wayne C. Booth assume that fiction
does have an ethical importance, they do not explicitly deal with the persuasive power of fiction,
define it, explore the reasons for this potential of fictional stories or relate it to formal conven-
tions.
of the 1990s. Moreover, it is not just factual stories that can persuade readers:
indeed, though it seems unlikely that narratives which readers knew to be
fictional and therefore without a factual truth-status could persuade them to
change their mental encyclopaedia and general world knowledge, many experi-
ments, like the path-breaking one conducted by Prentice, Gerrig and Bailis, have
shown that fiction is just as powerful, if not more so. The morals and values
embedded in literary works matter. In their overview of recent research in this
area, Green and Donahue show that these morals should be taken seriously and
questioned with regard to the kind of ethics that are spread via particular kinds of
fiction.
To date, no definitive study has explained why stories known to be figments
of the imagination can have such a potential for persuasion.2 Literary studies can
build on psychological research and offer good reasons for this phenomenon.
After all, the very characteristics of the reception of literature, in particular the
suspension of the “fact convention” (Schmidt, 110–143, particularly 116–117,
133–138), that is, the expectation that what is being read is not referring to actual
events, makes it easier to accept, for the moment, even quite strange things.
Readers thereby engage with views that might otherwise, in real life, seem
dubious or even threatening; in knowing that such views do not threaten one’s
cherished opinions, values, and current goals, the reader is opened to new
experiences. Safely curled up in an armchair, it becomes possible to play with
opinions and experiences too dangerous to introduce into social interaction –
similarly, the very fact that they are “only fictional” may be conducive to their
long-term effects. Many readers, when faced with factual stories, spend cognitive
effort on questioning the truth or utility of what has been read, in what is called a
state of transportation or immersion in a good story; however, if readers know
that a story is “just fiction,” it will not seem necessary to invest cognitive energy
in checking whether the content conforms to one’s own world knowledge (see
Green, Brock, and Kaufmann 313). Moreover, becoming immersed in a fictional
world goes hand in hand with accepting it; the process of questioning the story
world’s facticity occurs later. The suspension of disbelief, thus, naturally accom-
panies the process of reading good narratives. Contrary to the Romanticist belief
that the reading of fiction involves the willing suspension of disbelief, it requires
more cognitive effort to suspend belief and critically scrutinize the plausibility or
correctness of what has been read (see Gilbert; Schreier 332).
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2 Evocriticism has dealt with related issues, and some critics emphasize the power of fiction by
conceptualizing it as an adaptation, that is, fulfilling a unique and necessary role for the survival
of humans and the evolution of human brains (Boyd 150).
The reading of fiction has two possible effects that are noteworthy from the
point of view of ethical criticism: first, fictional stories disseminate values and
change readers’ beliefs; second, reading fictional narratives or viewing fictional
films can exercise cognitive and affective processes that are important for pro-
social behavior and for understanding others. Literature can thus foster empathy
as well as what has been termed “sensitive understanding” (Batson 267), which
encompasses both affective and cognitive processes. While the first effect
(changes in the reader’s convictions) has been the subject of extensive psycholo-
gical research, the second has not been afforded sustained critical inquiry. Until
recently, it has not been asked what kind of stories can encourage readers to
adopt the perspective of others, to discard former stereotypes, and to become
more tolerant towards atypical characters (Nünning, Reading Fictions). In the
following, I will concentrate on the second function that reading, particularly of
fictional stories, can fulfill, and I will propose a few hypotheses concerning the
relationships between the two.
In order to explore which narrative conventions can evoke sensitive under-
standing of others, it is necessary to first delineate the cognitive and affective
processes involved in this kind of understanding. Though there are no unanimous
definitions of key concepts, the neurosciences and psychology usually employ
the term “empathy” to refer to the affective processes of “feeling like” the other
while remaining aware of the difference between oneself and the other whose
feelings are being shared (Singer 433 and Batson). Related feelings, which are
connected to pro-social behavior, have also been referred to as sympathy, pity,
compassion, and sympathetic distress (Batson, Ahmad, and Lishner); they should
be distinguished from the kind of empathic sharing involved in perspective
taking. “Theory of mind” abilities, in contrast, refer to the capacity of cognitively
(albeit not necessarily affectively) gauging their beliefs, aims, and desires, and
drawing conclusion as to which intentions they pursue. Both processes are, in
different combinations, practiced in interactive encounters and in the reading of
fiction; in short, the understanding of people and the understanding of fictional
characters bear many resemblances. There seems to be a “shared neural basis for
attempting to make sense of real people and for processing fictional representa-
tions of persons” (Mar and Oatley 180).3 Moreover, the plasticity of the brain
ensures that extended and repeated practice will have biological as well as
mental consequences. These affective and cognitive activities are not in them-
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3 The following section, which explores the value of fiction with regard to perspective-taking,
consists of a revised and drastically shortened version of my article “Cognitive Science and the
Value of Literature for Life”.
selves linked to morality or altruistic behavior; on the contrary, to know just what
others think and feel makes it possible to deceive or hurt them more effectively.
One should therefore differentiate between the ethical and the cognitive values of
fiction – the latter encompasses, for example, the broadening of the reader’s
understandings of both implicit personality theories and the thought processes of
people completely different from the reader. Such an elaboration of implicit
personality theories is a precondition for pro-social action, since one must under-
stand the needs and feelings of others before one can put that knowledge into
practice. However, there is no necessary connection between the cognitive value
of literature, which has been demonstrated by Raymond Mar and his colleagues,
as well as by David Kidd and Emanuele Castano and literature’s ethical value.
Nonetheless, there is at least one kind of perspective-taking that can be
practiced in reading fiction and that has been shown to correlate with altruistic
behavior. This kind of “sensitive understanding” includes cognitive and affective
processes and involves imagining how another person would feel in the same
situation. In contrast, imagining oneself in the position of another is not necessa-
rily related to altruistic behavior. Even though these two practices are closely
linked, participants in experiments who were asked to adopt what psychologists
term the “imagine-self” perspective, which involves imagining how oneself would
feel in a given situation, not only felt different emotions but also experienced
different physiological symptoms than those who were asked to take the “ima-
gine-other” perspective (see Batson). Several conditions must be met in order to
adopt such a perspective, and I argue that fictional narratives are particularly apt
to fulfil these. As far as literature is concerned, the obstacles blocking perspective
taking in real-life situations are negligible: fictional narratives frequently provide
readers with the salient facts necessary to understand the characters as well as
the particular situation in which they act; the pleasure and interest that are part
of the experience of becoming immersed in fictional worlds offer an incentive to
invest the necessary cognitive efforts to assume the perspectives of characters;
and the problems accompanying the adoption of others’ perspectives in real life
are next to non-existent. The combination of these factors allows the reader to
regulate his or her own perspective and to imagine what the characters feel and
think, all while remaining aware of his or her differences from the characters.
Reading fiction thus affords a perfect opportunity for practicing perspective
taking that is, due to its manifold inherent difficulties, precarious in interactive
situations (see Decety and Sommerville; and Rameson and Lieberman).
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The Meaning of Form: Narrative Strategies
Fostering Perspective Taking
The conditions for the “imagine-other” perspective, involving imagining how the
other feels in a given situation, are more prone to be met while reading fiction
than in real life, yet this does not mean that every work of fiction induces the
reader to practice this kind of understanding. Unfortunately, psychological re-
search into the kind of narrative that unfolds fiction’s persuasive power has only
yielded few results. The most obvious correlation is between the reader’s degree
of transportation and his or her emotional engagement with the fate of the
characters. This is also linked to the persuasive power of fiction: the reader must
imaginatively, emotionally, and cognitively engage with the tale in order to care
about the characters and to adopt the beliefs and values that are being presented.
Interestingly, two factors related to the story content have been disproven: in
short, neither the “homophily” between reader and protagonist (that is, the
similarity between the reader and the character he or she feels empathy with) nor
the “nearness of topics” (the presentation of topics that interest the reader in his
or her daily activities) plays a role. According to Slater and Rouner, not even the
gender of the protagonist is of importance (see also Bortolussi, Dixon, and
Sopčák). Instead, what has been found to be significant in this respect are two
factors, namely, the quality of the writing and the “perceived realism” of the
story, both of which can be linked to stylistic features. Apparently, stories written
by canonical or bestselling authors have had more impact than those produced
by psychologists for the purposes of testing (Green 248–249). While this stands to
reason, it does not provide enlightenment as to the features that constitute a
story’s quality. However, I would argue that, from the perspective of literary
studies, one can point to a number of narrative conventions that encourage
perspective taking. It is worth emphasizing that these conventions cannot deter-
mine how individual readers respond to a text. Readers’ interpretation strategies
depend on their knowledge, as well as on their (emotional) experiences and
memories. It is difficult to point out textual features which usually result in
perspective taking of the intended authorial audience, but there are few strategies
that can ensure that someone who actively reads a text will at least share the
characters’ thoughts, if not their emotions. While there is a (bottom-up and top-
down) interplay between textual features and cognitive information processing
(Schneider, “Narrative Dynamics,” 51 f.), the schemata triggered by textual cues
are culture-specific and the individual experiences and memories within them
may differ widely. Moreover, there are variances with regard to the ability and
willingness of readers to adopt characters’ perspectives. Since culture plays a
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large role in how and why someone reads a text, differences between, for exam-
ple, Chinese and American or Western European readers are to be expected.
A tentative analysis of the narrative strategies and stylistic features encoura-
ging an adoption of the imagine-other perspective can begin with a story’s
“perceived realism.” This concept, which the psychologist Melanie Green has
correlated with the degree of transportation and the emotional interest of readers,
does not refer to realist fiction in the narrow sense of the word; instead, it aims at
the impression of readers who ascribe lifelikeness and plausibility to the story’s
events as well as to the feelings, intentions, and actions of the protagonists. What
is in question would seem to be what Keith Oatley, another psychologist who
values fictional stories because of the “vicarious experiences” they offer to read-
ers, terms the truth of coherence, that is, the text-internal consistency of the
events as well as the thoughts and feelings of the characters linked according to
principles and causes that are held to prevail also in real life (Oatley, “Fiction May
Be Twice,” 109). Oatley’s view is backed by various other experts on the field, for
instance Busselle and Bilandzic. Characters like Harry Potter or the hobbit Frodo
would thus meet the criterion of perceived realism. Within their respective fic-
tional worlds, the characters act in a way that is plausible to the extent that they
correspond to current folk psychology. Given the specific circumstances, readers
would expect the characters to feel and think –more or less – as they do. This fits
in well with the requirements for the imagine-other perspective: characters must
be lifelike in the sense that they conform to beliefs about psychological processes,
for this allows the reader to understand their thoughts, feelings, and actions. This
does not mean, of course, that in order for characters to be perceived as lifelike
they must be models of reason and internal consistency: on the contrary, small
deviations or even obvious defects can prove fascinating because they remain
within the bounds of the thinkable, despite also being beyond the pale of the
normal. Indeed, it could even be argued that the most lifelike characters are those
that are complex and carry internal contradictions. Moreover, genre conventions,
individual preferences, and the cognitive abilities of readers (for instance, chil-
dren as opposed to adults) each play a large role in defining what is plausible
within the frame of the fictional world. In a science fiction novel or in a fantasy,
for instance, wielding a lightsaber or a magic charm can be far more “realistic”
than shooting a pistol.
In addition to perceived realism, one must also consider narrative conven-
tions likely to evoke the reader’s interest in the fate and mental processes of
particular characters. As far as the imagine-other perspective is concerned, read-
ers must imagine how a character feels in a specific situation, given the charac-
ter’s particular perspective, that is, his or her system of preconditions, which is
shaped by personality traits, emotions, dispositions, beliefs, desires, and aims
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(see Hartner 150–160). Literary scholars have identified three main narrative
strategies capable of prompting the reader to take the perspective of characters,
to raise empathic feelings for the characters, and reduce the reader’s distance to
the characters. First, the adoption of characters’ perspectives can be initiated by
presenting their perceptions, thoughts, and feelings in a seemingly immediate
way, such as via quoted thoughts, interior monologue, free indirect discourse, or
psychonarration. This allows the reader to follow and empathically share the
mental processes and emotions of fictional characters, and thereby reduces the
distance between reader and characters. Second, narrator comments (and, at
least sometimes, comments by other characters) can add to the reader’s knowl-
edge about a character’s perspective or appeal to the reader to sympathize with
the character. These comments can fulfil a wide spectrum of functions: they can
explain a character’s motives, underscore a lack of alternatives to a character’s
actions (which might otherwise initially appear egotistic), emphasize a charac-
ter’s plight and suffering, relate a character’s actions to common human needs,
and so on.
Though the effects of these two conventions inviting readers to share char-
acters’ thoughts and feelings are closely linked, it is necessary to distinguish
between the different kinds of understanding they evoke. The first convention
enables the reader to follow characters’ mental processes, and is mainly con-
cerned with the aspect of focalization and the sharing of their fleeting percep-
tions. The second provides knowledge about the characters and offers insight into
their respective personalities and current mental states, thereby allowing the
reader to understand characters and adopt their perspectives without actually
following their thought processes. The first convention allows thinking like and
feeling like or with the character, that is, the participation in the character’s
thoughts and feelings. The second provides knowledge about the characters and
can, in turn, induce readers to feel for them. The latter allows for sympathy, pity,
and a deeper understanding of a character’s perspective. Both aspects are intri-
cately related as far as the taking of perspectives is concerned, but they proceed
via different means. Both are important for an exploration of the cognitive value
of literary works; they enable the reader to vicariously experience thoughts and
feelings of others and allow him or her to “simulate” characters’ emotions, there-
by enlarging the scope of the reader’s own knowledge as well as engaging
cognitive processes of crucial importance for social coexistence and interaction
(see Mar and Oatley, Tooby and Cosmides on the value of simulation).
The third, and equally time-honored, mode of heightening the interest and
empathy of readers is that of setting a character into a precarious position.
Creating suspense and evoking a situation of potential harm is a mode of enga-
ging the reader that is referred to as “situational empathy” (Hogan 140). Accord-
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ing to scholars like Richard Gerrig and Fritz Breithaupt, the situation and the
expectations which are raised with regard to it are of major importance for the
reader’s emotional responses. In order to feel with (and for) characters, they must
be in a situation that potentially allows for positive as well as negative endings.
In such situations, the reader is prone to evaluate the future development of
events in light of his or her own wishes as well as those of the characters. Scholars
have stressed the relation between the fictional situation and the reader’s sharing
of characters’ experiences and feeling; nonetheless, this narrative convention
differs significantly from the others, in that it provides an incentive for investing
the cognitive effort necessary for caring about a character’s mental processes.
Although putting a character in danger offers neither insight into his or her
personality nor any means for sharing complex mental processes, it reduces the
distance towards literary characters and is an important basis for the reader’s
willingness to take their perspectives.
It must be emphasized, however, that each of the three conventions discussed
above can, by the same token, be employed in order to increase the distance
between character and reader. For example, in her article “Theory of Narrative
Empathy,” Suzanne Keen emphasizes the difficulty in identifying – and demon-
strating – the effectiveness of such strategies as first-person narration (213–214).
Literary devices that enable – or force – the reader to follow the thoughts and
emotions of characters or speakers may increase this distance when these mental
processes contravene the reader’s values or “feeling rules” (Hochschild) – for
instance, when a character rejoices in the torture of another or fails to mourn the
death of a friend. In particular, contemporary and multi-perspective works fre-
quently present abhorrent, disgusting, or, at least, undesirable feelings that the
reader understands though they evoke negative emotions instead of empathic
sharing. Likewise, narrator comments can just as well highlight a character’s
egotistic and self-serving aims, which might otherwise have remained hidden.
Even placing a character into a dangerous situation does not necessarily increase
the reader’s desire to adopt the character’s perspective: indeed, it is a staple of
thrillers that readers are induced to hope for the failure or even death of a one of
the main characters, while feeling with his or her victim. In this respect, the
character of a serial killer may serve as focalizer in precarious situations, with the
reader hoping that the character will be apprehended in time. The process of
sharing thoughts and emotions can therefore be reduced to a merely rational
process, one which evokes disgust and antipathy rather than empathy. In such
cases, adopting a character’s perspective may still broaden the reader’s knowl-
edge and refine his or her personality theory, but it does not involve an evocation
of similar feelings. When it comes to literary conventions, there is no form-to-
function mapping: the cognitive, as well as the ethical potential of fiction is
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shaped by a combination and arrangement of different strategies, as well as by
the strategies’ relations to the story’s contents and to the cultural values of the
time of its production.
I wish to argue that increasing the reader-character distance is of crucial
importance for the process of perspective taking. Losing awareness of the differ-
ence between oneself and a character implies complete identification with the
character’s goals and could result in the adoption of the imagine-self perspective.
This is rare, however, even as far as the empathic sharing of thoughts and feelings
is concerned. In contrast to scholars such as Keith Oatley, I argue that a dual
process is involved in sharing a character’s thoughts and feelings. This process
consists of an oscillation between two quite different cognitive activities on the
part of the reader: First, there is the process of “feeling like” the character in
question (Mar, Oatley, Djikic, and Mullin 824; Schneider, “Cognitive Theory,”
613). Depending on the particular context, this process shifts between a more
emotional and a more cognitive simulation of the character’s thoughts and
feelings; the latter simulation would prevail, for instance, when following the
thoughts of an anti-hero or villain. Second, the process of simulation is linked to
the reader’s own appraisal of the situation in question. This appraisal is influ-
enced by the reader’s knowledge of the text thus far read, and can include
information about events not available to the focalizer. It is also based on the
reader’s own experiences and what he or she wishes to see in the story’s further
development. This second process is intricately connected to an overall assess-
ment of the situation and to the moral positioning of readers; it is closely related
to questions of ethics. As James Phelan has noted, “[o]ur emotions and desires
about both fictional and nonfictional characters are intimately tied to our judg-
ments of them” (Living to Tell about It 160).
The Ethics of Form: Narrative Strategies from an
Ethical Point of View
So far, I have stressed that the adoption of the imagine-other perspective is
ethically desirable. This corresponds to the Western tradition of appreciating
empathy, sympathy, and the power of literature to evoke these feelings. As the
pro-social associations of the imagine-other perspective evidence, there is good
reason to follow this tradition, to which authors such as George Eliot have
contributed. Moreover, the kind of “ambassadorial empathy” (Keen, “Strategic
Empathizing,” 483–487) that raises sympathetic understanding for members of
out-groups can have important beneficial consequences. Nonetheless, I wish to
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argue that both raising and blocking empathy, as well as careful orchestration
and modulation of distancing devices, are at the center of an ethics of fictional
form; in short, creating distance is just as important as reducing it. Especially in
light of psychological studies, the use of distancing devices seems even more
important, since readers tend to supply characters’ emotions and thoughts with-
out having to be told about them explicitly and without benefit of the conventions
described earlier (Habermas and Diel).
With regard to the ethical value of literature, it is advantageous to differenti-
ate between two aspects: On the one hand, there is the reduction of the distance
between readers and characters, and the adoption of the imagine-other perspec-
tive. This can increase the reader’s knowledge; it also exercises mental processes
that can subsequently be activated in real-life situations. On the other hand, it is
important to emphasize the ethical significance of distancing devices that contri-
bute to an awareness of the differences between readers and characters. Especially
in postmodern times, it is necessary to consider the experience of alterity, of the
otherness of others. According to the French philosopher Alain Badiou (41), the
acceptance of alterity and the radical difference between oneself and everybody
else (including oneself) is a cornerstone of a theory of ethics. This view is compa-
tible with a Levinas-inspired ethics, which has moved away from the prescriptive
dimension of traditional values and towards a more tentative and open postmo-
dern ethics. As Herbert Grabes asserts, “[i]f multiplicity, heterogeneity or alterity
are the predominant features of this period, as regards both society and individual
search for identity, contemporary ethics must […] promote an ethical stance that
will […] enable us to live in it with dignity” (“Ethics, Aesthetics” 25–26). Because
we live in a society marked by multiplicity, heterogeneity, and alterity, literary
works have an ethical value that transcends the practice of the imagine-other
perspective, for they not only enable us to appreciate this kind of heterogeneity
and complexity, but also help us to accept otherness, to refrain from stereotyping
and categorizing others, and to abandon the insistence on closure. This does not
imply a devaluation of the kind of perspective taking described above; rather, it
makes it possible to appreciate the ethical value of narrative strategies that induce
both sensitive understanding of lifelike characters and the acknowledgement of
instability, openness, heterogeneity, and complexity.
It therefore seems promising to briefly consider aesthetic devices that in-
crease the distance between readers and characters. Practicing empathy is only
part of a more complex cognitive process as far as altruistic behaviour is con-
cerned: it is also necessary to differentiate between persons whom one should
empathize with and those whom one should not. Moreover, distancing strategies
are closely linked to the aesthetic quality of literature. Viktor Shklovsky has
related this to the techniques of defamiliarization; he stresses that a major asset
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of reading literature is to make the familiar appear strange, to change ingrained
paths of perception, and to enhance the cognitive effort of understanding the
represented elements (12–13). According to Shklovsky, literature can enable read-
ers to break from routines, to see – and appreciate and evaluate – things anew.
Defamiliarizing devices, which slow the reading process and enhance the dis-
tance of what is being described to the reader (who must puzzle out what is
meant) can also open the space necessary for questioning stereotypes and pre-
judices and for affectively engaging with characters who may initially seem
strange. On the basis of Shklovsky’s insights, David Miall and Don Kuiken claim
that aesthetic devices instigate a “a three-phase structure in response” (299) that
encourages readers to search for a new context in order to comprehend the
defamiliarizing phrase, metaphor, or attitude, and ultimately achieve deeper
understanding.
However, defamiliarizing devices do not always lead to cognitive closure;
from an ethical perspective, what seems to be even more important is the flex-
ibility and openness such devices require of readers. For example, it is frequently
impossible to categorize characters; especially in modernist works, the first
description of a figure often amounts to nothing more than hints about their
opinions, attitudes, or dispositions. Ambiguity and uncertainty often feature in
fictional stories, and this kind of polyvalence relates to the power of fiction to
engage readers’ emotions as well as their interests. Moreover, the dynamics of the
reading process must be taken into account: the same character may appear in a
different light in separate situations, and, until the end of the story, it may remain
uncertain whether or not there will be a reversal that will necessitate a revision
and reinterpretation of the story’s events. In contrast to our routines in everyday
life, in reading fiction our first impressions are often questioned and need to be
revised. Even in some types of formula fiction – for example, romance page-
turners and detective novels – part of the suspense is engendered by uncertainty
about whether a character is indeed what he or she seems. In many cases, it is
possible in retrospect to recognize former misunderstandings and to reinterpret
events in light of these new insights; in other cases, the uncertainty concerning
the evaluation of a character remains. Some literary texts necessitate the acknowl-
edgement of complexity and otherness as well as only partial comprehension;
they deny cognitive closure and complete comprehension.
In particular, multi-perspective texts that present a wide range of heteroge-
neous characters – and the personality traits, values, and emotional dispositions
they embody – can initiate a number of cognitive activities that add to the ethical
value of fiction. Shifts in focalization, which call for rapid adjustment to different
points of view, can enhance the effects of defamiliarization. This change between
focalizers becomes more demanding if characters’ respective perceptions are not
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easily reconciled, if characters interpret and evaluate an object or situation in
different ways. Henrike Moll and Andrew Meltzoff, in their studies of child devel-
opment, have stressed that there is a huge difference between, on the one hand,
taking the perspective of a character and, on the other, “confronting” different
perspectives and dealing with heterogeneous points of view (672). This differen-
tiation is also important for understanding the cognitive and the ethical value of
reading fiction. Encountering a story’s events via a character’s perceptual and
cognitive point of view encourages the reader to take the character’s perspective
and share in his or her feelings; however, the presentation of contradictions
between different characters’ perspectives makes it necessary that the reader
gains distance from them. The reader must simultaneously share and critically
evaluate the characters’ views and decide whether to adopt the interpretation
given by one character over that of another – or to arrive at a completely different
interpretation, on the basis of their own (superior) knowledge. This implies that
the reader must choose which characters to empathize with and which to main-
tain distance from. Contradictory perspectives and shifts in focalization not only
highlight the heterogeneity of perception and feeling; they also ask the reader to
practice a cognitively complex process of “confronting” perspectives and forming
his or her own opinions as well as positioning oneself in the face of such contra-
dictions. A similar potential for foregrounding inconsistencies lies in the use of
dramatic irony, which signifies a discrepancy of knowledge between the charac-
ter or narrator and the reader, who is in a position to recognize the former’s errors.
Various other aesthetic devices can also guide the processes of perspective taking.
It is infeasible to discuss them here, as an effective and detailed account would
have to explore, among other things, conventions concerning the handling of
time and the importance of ambiguities and gaps or blanks (Iser 67, 68).
Multi-perspective works especially necessitate the interpretation, evaluation,
and weighting of different perspectives. In order to arrive at an understanding of
an event that has been presented from the respective points of view of different
characters, the reader must assess not just the characters’ reliability and their
comprehension of the facts but also their moral values. The reader’s ethical
response is relatively clearly guided by the text when both bonding and distan-
cing devices tend to work toward the same ethical purpose. Notable examples of
such texts include those eighteenth-century and Victorian novels that heeded the
maxim of the “just distribution of sympathy,” with villains being presented in an
unfavorable light and heroes in a favorable one.4 Especially in modernist and
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4 Even in the eighteenth century, it was not always easy for authors to ensure that readers would
discern the textual story in the author’s intended way. For example, Samuel Richardson found
postmodernist works, however, it is frequently impossible to arrive at a conclu-
sion that categorizes the respective views and values as either “reliable” and
“ethically sound” or as “untrustworthy.” The heterogeneity of even a single
character’s thoughts, feelings, and dispositions often impedes such judgments;
the comfort of cognitive closure remains beyond reach. Readers are encouraged
to accept alterity and heterogeneity. They practice a process that, from an ethical
perspective, is arguably as valuable as adopting the perspectives of others. In
literary works, this process is guided by distancing and engaging devices. Narra-
tive conventions that reduce the distance towards the characters invite the reader
to empathically share the characters’ thoughts and to develop an understanding
of and fellow feeling with different, even mutually exclusive, viewpoints.5 If at
least some of the focalizers or narrators can engage the reader’s sympathy, it
becomes more difficult to condemn their limitations and depreciate them as being
untrustworthy. The complexity and denial of closure inspired by the use of
narrative forms can thus induce readers to comprehend contradictory positions,
thereby rendering alterity more acceptable and moving towards an ethics of
alterity.
The ethical implications of particular combinations of bonding and distan-
cing devices are even more complex in works that foreground the question of the
reliability of narrators or focalizers (Phelan, “Estranging Unreliability”). Unreli-
able narration is per se a problematic narrative device as far as the ethics of a
novel are concerned. After all, unreliable narrators usually tell their story from
their own point of view; particularly those sincere, but in some way misguided,
deviant or mentally ill character narrators that Booth (304) and many others dealt
with allow us insight into their thought processes and justify their behaviors in
accordance with their own norms, trying to encourage the reader to empathize
with them. A skillful handling of free indirect discourse may allow for some
degree of ironic distancing between the narrator and the focalizer, which a careful
reader may discern – but with regard to unreliable narrators this kind of distance
simultaneously becomes crucial and problematic. The relation between ethics
and unreliable narrators with questionable norms and values is thus fraught with
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that the villain of his novel Clarissa (published in 1748) actually evoked the sympathy of many of
his intended readers. Moreover, the dynamics of the reading process must be taken into account:
just as the same character may appear in a different light in different situations, the relations
between characters shift, and heroes may appear less admirable and villains less despicable at
different stages of the text. I owe this reference concerning the wide spectrum between the
bonding and distancing devices in the same narrative text to the editors of this volume.
5 For a discussion of such narrators in recent British novels, see my article “Ethics and Aes-
thetics,” onwhich the following arguments are based.
contradictions. On the one hand, the confrontation with radically different views
may establish this kind of fiction as a valuable vehicle for ethics, because it
evokes an experience of alterity. On the other hand, the reader’s gaining of insight
into the consciousness of morally suspect narrators and being invited to share
such narrators’ thoughts and feelings may lead to a development of sympathy for
both the narrators and their questionable ethics. Moreover, the confrontation
with – ethically questionable – unreliable narrators or focalizers can serve a
function that is ethically important: these narrators may initiate self-reflection
into the reader’s own, differing values and principles. After all, cognitively
following the thoughts of narrators or characters does not necessarily imply either
affective sharing or a loss of critical distance on the part of the reader. On the
contrary, the exposure to offensive views and feelings may, especially in novels
that feature contrasting perspectives or elicit pity for the narrator’s victims, lead
to disgust and to a reaffirmation of the reader’s values.
A similar, perhaps even more important, kind of ethical reflection can be
inspired by multi-perspective works featuring heterogeneous perspectives that
can neither be reconciled with each other nor discarded as irrelevant or simply
wrong. Such novels, which require openness and acceptance of ambiguity and
complexity on the part of readers, implicitly raise the question of whether there
are absolute ethical values. These works raise readers’ awareness with regard to
the hierarchization of values or the problems of neatly distinguishing between
“acceptable” and “unacceptable” positions. The same function can be fulfilled by
novels that include several narrators or present only a particular point of view
while hinting at other, equally valid ones. The use of narrative bonding and
distancing devices thus emphasizes the problem that there might be – as claimed
by Alain Badiou (43, 61, 65–81), for example – no ethics “in the abstract” but only
an “ethics of truths,” which acknowledges that truth can only be related to (and
come into being in) particular situations and particular individuals. The aware-
ness of and reflection on such an “ethics of truths” can be enhanced through a
use of narrative conventions that leads readers to care about characters, to
become involved in characters’ fates, and to adopt their perspectives, yet which
at the same time require the recognition of the heterogeneity of and contradic-
tions between the positions the characters embody.
These observations concerning the initiation of ethical reflections on the read-
er’s ownvalues alreadypoint toward relationships between the twopossible effects
of reading fiction: on the one hand, the dissemination of values and effecting
change of the reader’s beliefs, and, on the other, the practice of cognitive and
affective processes important for understanding human beings. The topic certainly
merits further attention, but I would like to suggest that three interrelations espe-
ciallywarrant exploration. First, theprocess of takingperspectives andarriving at a
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deeper understanding of the beliefs, emotions, and actions of fictional characters
may lead to a higher appreciation of perspective taking and a recognition of its
importance for behaving responsibly in complex social situations. Second, shifts
fromcategorization to individuation and the discardingof stereotyping aparticular
character may engender a change of attitude towards particular stereotypes or an
awareness of the problems of stereotyping in general. Third, taking the perspec-
tives of characters and temporarily adopting their values and traits may lead to a
reflection on and appraisal of these values and thereby result in the dissemination
of values. It should be emphasized that the latter two of these relationships are
interconnected, sinceahighappreciationof aparticular attitudeorpersonality trait
embodied by a character will enhance the reader’s willingness to adopt that
character’sperspective and to shift fromcategorization to individuation.
In addition, both possible ethical effects of reading fiction depend on the
reader’s transportation. They are also closely related to the reader’s willingness
and ability to become emotionally and cognitively immersed into the story world.
While it has been shown that engaging the reader’s emotions enhances the degree
of transportation and the persuasiveness of a story, there may also be a reciprocal
relation with highly ethical texts that involve readers’ emotions to a greater extent
than do other works.6 There thus seems to be a two-way interaction between
ethics and emotions, which may account for the persistent persuasiveness and
appeal of certain literary fictions that have continued to fascinate readers through
the ages.
Conclusion: Fields of Research for a Cognitively
Informed Ethical Criticism
Reading fiction is not just a pleasurable pastime. It conveys values, exercises
cognitive and affective processes, and shapes readers’ minds. The ethical impor-
tance of literature has been stressed by scholars in both Western and Eastern
countries. Rarely, however, has it been attempted to consider insights from
psychology and cognitive studies in order to link the use of particular constella-
tions of narrative conventions to specific kinds of ethical values. While the effects
of particular narrative conventions always depend on their specific combination
and weighting as well as on the content and context of the particular work, two
aspects merit consideration with regard to the analysis of the ethical value of
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6 I owe this suggestion to Shang Biwu and Nie Zhenzhao.
specific works of literature: first, the power of literature to encourage readers to
adopt and practice the imagine-other perspective and, closely related, the use of
narrative conventions that reduce the distance to lifelike characters; and, second,
the importance of distancing devices and of strategies enhancing the work’s
complexity and denying the reader cognitive closure. These seemingly contra-
dictory narrative conventions often occur in combination with each other, and a
more or less balanced mixture between them seems to correspond to major
features of post-modern ethics – the sharing of experiences of lifelike characters
in complex works that resist easy answers and encourage readers to accept and
even appreciate heterogeneity and alterity.
However, many questions remain open, especially as far as the effects of the
arrangement of specific narrative strategies are concerned. A framework for
understanding such combinations has been sketched here, yet this could be
further detailed and modified in any number of ways worthy of exploration.
Which constellations of particular devices reduce the distance between reader
and character and invite the reader to feel with and for the character in question?
To what extent are these combinations subject to historical change, what role is
played by cultural values, and is it possible to relate specific constellations to
specific genres? Are there particular devices that can be identified in a large
number of cases (at least as far as the adult readers are concerned), such as
placing the protagonist in a precarious situation, admiring and understanding
comments from other “ideal characters,” and concentrating on the protagonist’s
point of view, as might be suggested by a look at eighteenth-century devices still
in use today (for example, see my article “Voicing Criticism”)? And, last but not
least, what role do specific cultural models play as far as concerns, for instance,
features about the contents of the work or the depiction of the characters? How do
characteristics such as physical attractiveness, (generally) ideal personality traits,
and emotional dispositions relate to the use of formal conventions?
The number of open research questions could daunt scholars into surrender-
ing before even making any attempt. However, there are good reasons for endea-
voring to address these problems. The persuasive power of fiction is a fact:
fictional stories have an ethical impact – and literary and cultural scholars seem
to be the only people with the requisite expertise not only to explore the dissemi-
nation of values in given (popular) texts and films, but also to analyze which
ethically valuable practices become initiated in the reading of such works. At a
moment when the legitimization of literary scholarship has become an urgent
problem in many countries, the promise of such a benefit is particularly stimulat-
ing and justifying.
The Ethics of (Fictional) Form 53
Works Cited
Badiou, Alain. Ethik: Versuch über das Bewusstsein des Bösen (Ethics: An Essay on the Under-
standing of Evil). Trans. Jürgen Brankel. 1993. Wien: Turia und Kant, 2003.
Batson, Daniel C. “Two Forms of Perspective Taking: Imagining How Another Feels and Imagining
How You Would Feel.” Handbook of Imagination andMental Simulation. Eds. Keith Mark-
man, William Klein and Julie Suhr. New York: Psychology Press, 2009. 267–279.
Batson, Daniel C., Marina P. Polycarpou, Eddie Harmon-Jones, Heidi J. Imhoff, Erin C. Mitchener,
Lori L. Bednar, Tricia R. Klein, and Lori Highberger. “Empathy and Attitudes: Can Feeling for
a Member of a Stigmatized Group Improve Feelings Toward the Group?” Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology 72.1 (1997): 105–118.
Batson, Daniel C., Nadia Ahmad, and David A. Lishner. “Empathy and Altruism.” Oxford Hand-
book of Positive Psychology. Eds. Shane J. Lopez, and C.R. Snyder. Oxford: Oxford UP,
2009. 417–426.
Booth, Wayne C. The Rhetoric of Fiction. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1961.
Bortolussi, Marisa, Peter Dixon, and Paul Sopčák. “Gender and Reading.” Poetics 38 (2010):
299–318.
Boyd, Brian. “Evolutionary Theories of Art.” The Literary Animal: Evolution and the Nature of
Narrative. Eds. Jonathan Gottschall and David S. Wilson. Evanston, IL: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press 2005. 147–178.
Breithaupt, Fritz. Kulturen der Empathie (Cultures of Empathy). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp,
2009.
Busselle, Rick, and Helena Bilandzic. “Fictionality and Perceived Realism in Experiencing Stories:
A Model of Narrative Comprehension and Engagement.” Communication Theory 18.2
(2008): 255–280.
Cohen, Jonathan. “Defining Identification: A Theoretical Look at the Identification of Audiences
with Media Characters.”Mass Communication and Society 4.3 (2010): 245–264.
de Vignemont, Frédérique, and Tania Singer. “The Empathic Brain: How, When andWhy?” Trends
in Cognitive Sciences 10 (2006): 435–441.
Decety, Jean, and Jerry A. Sommerville. “Shared Representations Between Self and Others:
A Social Cognitive Neuroscience View.” Trends in Cognitive Science 7 (2003): 527–533.
Djikic, Maja, Keith Oatley, Sara Zoeterman, and Jordan B. Peterson. “On Being Moved by Art:
How Reading Fiction Transforms the Self.” Creativity Research Journal 21.1 (2009): 24–29.
Eagleton, Terry. The Event of Literature. New Haven: Yale UP, 2012.
Gerrig, Richard J. Experiencing Narrative Worlds. New Haven: Yale UP, 1993.
–––. “Perspective as Participation.” New Perspectives on Narrative Perspective. Eds. Willie van
Peer, and Seymour Chatman. Albany: State U of New York P, 2001. 303–323.
Gerrig, Richard J., and David Allbritton. “The Construction of Literary Character: A View from
Cognitive Psychology.” Style 24 (1990): 380–391.
Gilbert, Daniel S. “HowMental Systems Believe.” American Psychologist 46.2 (1991): 107–119.
Grabes, Herbert. “Ethics, Aesthetics, and Alterity.” Ethics and Aesthetics: The Moral Turn of
Postmodernism. Eds. Gerhard Hoffmann and Alfred Hornung. Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1996.
13–28.
–––. “The Processualities of Literature.” Journal of Literature and Art Studies 3.1 (2013): 1–8.
Green, Melanie C. “Transportation into Narrative Worlds: The Role of Prior Knowledge and
Perceived Realism.” Discourse Processes 38.2 (2004): 247–266.
54 Vera Nünning
Green, Melanie C., Timothy C. Brock, and Geoff F. Kaufman. “Understanding Media Enjoyment:
The Role of Transportation into Narrative Worlds.” Communication Theory 14.4 (2004):
311–327.
Green, Melanie C. and John Donahue. “Simulated Worlds: Transportation into Narratives.” Hand-
book of Imagination and Mental Simulation. Eds. Keith D. Markman, William Klein, and Julie
Suhr. New York: Psychology Press, 2009. 241–254.
Habermas, Tilman, and Verena Diel. “The Emotional Impact of Loss Narratives: Event Severity and
Narrative Perspectives.” Emotion 10.3 (2010): 312–323.
Harrison, Mary-Catherine. “How Narrative Relationships Overcome Empathic Bias: Elizabeth
Gaskell’s Empathy across Social Difference.” Poetics Today 32.2 (2011): 255–288.
Hartner, Marcus. Perspektivische Interaktion im Roman. Kognition, Rezeption, Interpretation
(Perspectival Interaction in the Novel: Cognition, Reception, Interpretation). Berlin, Boston:
de Gruyter, 2012.
Hernadi, Paul. “Why is Literature: A Coevolutionary Perspective on Imaginative Worldmaking.”
Poetics Today 23.1 (2002): 21–42.
Hochschild, Arlie R. The Managed Heart. Commercialization of Human Feeling. Berkeley: U of
California P, 1983.
Hogan, Patrick Colm. The Mind and Its Stories: Narrative Universals and Human Emotion. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge UP, 2003.
Iser, Wolfgang. Der implizite Leser: Kommunikationsformen des Romans von Bunyan bis Beckett
(The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett).
München: Wilhelm Fink, 1972.
Jameson, Fredric. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. [1981] London:
Methuen, 1983.
Keen, Suzanne. “A Theory of Narrative Empathy.” Narrative 13 (2006): 207–236.
–––. Empathy and the Novel. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007.
–––. “Strategic Empathizing: Techniques of Bounded, Ambassadorial, and Broadcast Narrative
Empathy.” Deutsche Vierteljahreszeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte
82.3 (2008): 477–493.
Kidd, David C., and Emanuele Castano. “Reading Literary Fiction Improves Theory of Mind.”
Science 342 (2013): 377–381.
Mar, Raymond A., and Keith Oatley. “The Function of Fiction is the Abstraction and Simulation of
Social Experience.” Perspectives on Psychological Science 3 (2008): 173–192.
Mar, Raymond A., Keith Oatley, and Jordan B. Peterson. “Exploring the Link Between Reading
Fiction and Empathy: Ruling Out Individual Differences and Examining Outcomes.” Commu-
nications 34.4 (2009): 407–428.
Mar, Raymond A., Keith Oatley, Maja Djikic, and Justin Mullin. “Emotion and Narrative Fiction:
Interactive Influences Before, During, and After Reading.” Cognition & Emotion 25.5 (2010):
818–833.
Miall, David S., and Don Kuiken. “Shifting Perspectives: Readers’ Feelings and Literary Re-
sponse.” New Perspectives on Narrative Perspective. Eds. Willie van Peer and Seymour
Chatman. Albany: State U of New York P, 2001. 289–302.
Miller, Jay Hillis. “Should We Read or Teach Literature Now?” Anglia 129 (2011): 1–11.
Moll, Henrike, and Andrew N. Meltzoff. “How Does It Look? Level 2 Perspective-Taking at 36
Months of Age.” Child Developement 82 (2011): 661–673.
Müller, Wolfgang G. „Moralische Implikationen erzähltechnischer Innovationen bei Jane Austen
(Moral).“ Ethik und Moral als Problem der Literatur und Literaturwissenschaft (Ethics and
The Ethics of (Fictional) Form 55
Morality as Problems of Literature and Literary Studies). Eds. Jutta Zimmermann and Britta
Salheiser. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2006. 117–132.
Nünning, Vera. “Ethics and Aesthetics in British Novels at the Beginning of the Twenty-First
Century.” Ethics in Culture: The Dissemination of Value Through Literature and Other Media.
Eds. Astrid Erll, Herbert Grabes, and Ansgar Nünning. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008.
369–392.
–––. “Voicing Criticism in Eighteenth-Century Novels by Women: Narrative Attempts at Claiming
Authority.” English Past and Present. Selected Papers from the IAUPE Malta Conference in
2010. Ed. Wolfgang Viereck. Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 2012. 81–108.
–––. “Cognitive Science and the Value of Literature for Life.” Values of Literature. Eds. Hanna
Meretoja, Saija Isomaa, Pirjo Lyytikäinen, and Kristina Malmio. Amsterdam: Brill Rodopi
2015. 85–106.
–––. Reading Fictions, ChangingMinds: The Cognitive Value of Fiction. Heidelberg: Winter 2014.
Oatley, Keith. “Why Fiction May Be Twice as True as Fact: Fiction as Cognitive and Emotional
Simulation” in: Review of General Psychology 3 (1999): 101–117.
–––. “Communications to Self and Others: Emotional Experience and Its Skills.” Emotion Review
1.3 (2009): 206–13.
Phelan, James. Living to Tell about It: A Rhetoric and Ethics of Character Narration. Ithaca,
London: Cornell UP, 2005.
–––. “Estranging Unreliability, Bonding Unreliability, and the Ethics of Lolita.” Narrative 15.2
(2007): 222–238.
Prentice, Deborah A., Richard J. Gerrig, and Daniel S. Bailis. “What Readers Bring to the Proces-
sing of Fictional Texts.” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 4.3 (1997): 416–420.
Rameson, Lian, and Matthew D. Lieberman. “Empathy: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Ap-
proach.” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 3.1 (2009): 94–110.
Schmidt, Siegfried J. Grundriß der Empirischen Literaturwissenschaft. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp,
1991.
Schneider, Ralf. “Toward a Cognitive Theory of Literary Character: The Dynamics of Mental-Model
Construction.” Style 35 (2001): 607–642.
–––. “New Narrative Dynamics? How the Order of a Text and the Reader’s Cognition and Emotion
Create Its Meanings.” Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift 63.1 (2013): 47–68.
Schreier, Margrit. “Belief Change Through Fiction. How Fictional Narratives Affect Real Readers.”
Grenzen der Literatur. Zu Begriff und Phänomen des Literarischen. Eds. Simone Winko, Fotis
Jannidis and Gerhard Lauer. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 2009. 315–337.
Shang, Biwu. In Pursuit of Narrative Dynamics. A Study of James Phelan’s Rhetorical Theory of
Narrative. Bern: Peter Lang, 2011.
Shklovsky, Viktor. “Art as Technique” [1917]. Russian Formalist Criticism. Four Essays. Eds. Lee
T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1965. 3–24.
Singer, Tania. “The Neuronal Basis and Ontogeny of Empathy andMind Reading: Review of
Literature and Implications for Future Research.” Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews
30.6 (2006): 855–863.
Slater, Michael D., and Donna Rouner. “Entertainment-Education and Elaboration Likelihood:
Understanding the Processing of Narrative Persuasion.” Communication Theory 12.2 (2002):
173–891.
Tooby, John, and Leda Cosmides. “Does Beauty Build Adapted Minds? Toward an Evolutionary
Theory of Aesthetics, Fiction and the Arts.” SubStance. A Review of Theory and Literary
Criticism 30 (2001): 6–27.
56 Vera Nünning
